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Abstract
In recent years a number of scholars have debated the economic efficiency of takeover-bid legislation and of
permissible defensive tactics taken by the management of takeover target corporations. This article reviews
and comments on this literature and draws attention to a number of empirical questions raised by the debate.
It concludes that the important outstanding issues are: i) the degree to which takeover rules interfere with the
deterrence of management inefficiency, and ii) the cost of allocating assets to their most highly-valued uses
through competitive bidding as opposed to the likelihood and cost of retransfers of assets after takeovers
without competitive bidding.
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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND
TAKEOVER BID REGULATION
By MARK R. GiLLEN*
In recent years a number of scholars have debated the economic efficiency of takeover-
bid legislation and ofpermissible defensive tactics taken by the management of takeover
target corporations. This article reviews and comments on this literature and draws
attention to a number of empirical questions raised by the debate It concludes that
the important outstanding issues are." i) the degree to which takeover rules interfere
with the deterrence of management inefficiency, and ii) the cost of allocating assets
to their most highly-valued uses through competitive bidding as opposed to the likelihood
and cost of retransfers of assets after takeovers without competitive bidding.
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L INTRODUCTION
When Campeau Corporation Ltd. made a takeover bid for Allied
Stores Inc., Allied's shares were trading at $48 u.s. per share before
the bid. Campeau's bid was $58 U.S. per share. In the wake of speculation
and a competing bid, the final transaction was completed at $67 u.s.
per share.
At the time Gulf Canada Ltd. made a bid for Hiram Walker Resources
Ltd., Hiram Walker shares were trading at approximately $28 per share
before the bid. Gulf Canada's initial bid was made at $32 per share.
When the dust settled after an intervening bid by Trans Canada Pipe
Lines Ltd., the takeover price was $38 per share.
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The premium in the Campeau-Allied takeover was a 40% increase
over the pre-bid price and the premium in the Gulf-Hiram Walker takeover
was approximately a 35% increase over the pre-bid share price.
Are such premiums beneficial? This question has been extensively
debated from an economic efficiency point of view in a number of articles
in recent years., An analysis from this perspective attempts to formulate
a legal framework which allocates the limited resources available to uses
from which society will derive the greatest value. The debate over the
economic efficiency of takeover bid legislation and takeover bid defensive
tactics generally considers the legal arrangement all shareholders2 would
choose in order to maximize their pre-takeover bid wealth. Such a legal
arrangement will correspond with the economically efficient, or social
welfare maximizing solution, as long as the shareholders receive all the
benefits and bear all the costs of the legal arrangement.
One argument is that existing legal rules relating to takeovers interfere
with those takeovers that would replace inefficient managements. On
the other hand, it is argued that the legal interference is not significant.
In fact, competitive bidding and high takeover premiums caused by the
existing rules have numerous beneficial effects.
This article reviews and comments on this literature and draws
attention to a number of empirical questions raised by the debate. It
concludes that the most important outstanding issues in the debate are:
(i) the degree to which takeover rules interfere with the deterrence of
management inefficiency; and (ii) the cost of allocating assets to their
most highly-valued uses through competitive bidding3 in takeovers, as
D.R. Fischel, "Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers" (1978) 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel,
"The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer" (1981) 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 1161 [hereinafter referred to as Easterbrook & Fischel I]; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel,
"Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers" (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 [hereinafter referred to
as Easterbrook & Fischel I]; F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions"
(1982) 91 Yale LJ. 698 [hereinafter referred to as Easterbrook & Fischel mI]; L.A. Bebchuk, "The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers" (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 [hereinafter referred
to as Bebchuk I]; L.A. Bebchuk, "The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply
and Extension" (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 [hereinafter referred to as Bebchuk I]; L.A. Bebchuk,
"The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?) Reply" (1986) 2 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 253 [hereinafter referred to as Bebchuk 111]; RJ. Gilson, "A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers" (1982) 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819 [hereinafter
referred to as Gilson I]; RJ. Gilson, "Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense" (1982) 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 [hereinafter referred to as Gilson I1]; A. Schwartz,
"Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction" (1986) 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 2 [hereinafter referred
to as Schwartz I]; A. Schwartz, "Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods" (1986) 2 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 271 [hereinafter referred to as Schwartz ]1]; J.C. Coffee, Jr., "Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance" (1984) 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1145.
2 This includes both bidder and target shareholders since the arrangement considered here
would be before the identification of a corporation as a target
3 The literature often refers to promoting auctions interchangeably with a reference to
competitive bidding.
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opposed to the likelihood and cost of retransfers of assets after takeovers
without competitive bidding. The article also concludes that the claim
that competitive bidding is necessary to allocate assets to their most
highly-valued use is the only claim in this debate which supports the
need for a mandatory legislative auction regime. Part II provides a
background for the debate and Part III reviews and comments on
arguments made in the debate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Growth of Cash Takeover Bids and the Perceived Problems
In the 1960s, there was a high level of acquisition activity4 during
which time the use of cash takeover bidss increased substantially.6 In
1960 there were eight cash takeover bids on both the American Stock
Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange. In 1965 there were twenty-
nine cash takeover bids on these exchanges, and in the first half of the
1966 these exchanges recorded thirty-two cash takeover bids.7
As the use of cash takeover bids increased, concern over the effects
of such bids on the shareholders of takeover target corporation grew.
In the United States these concerns focused on the use of cash takeover
bids to avoid the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
This disclosure requirements would apply only in a share exchange offer.8
Academic literature and comments in the latter half of the 1960s
suggested problems associated with cash takeover bids that fall into the
following categories:
(i) Corporations and their shareholders need to be protected from
corporate raiders and looters who seize control of, and liquidate,
corporations.9
(ii) Offeree shareholders lack sufficient information to decide
whether they should tender their shares in the hope of retaining a share
4 See F.A. Beams, Advanced Accounting, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1982) at 2, and Copland & Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 1983, at 560. (Reading
Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. c. 1983).
5 The Canadian terminology of "cash takeover bid" will be used throughout this article rather
than the U.S. term "cash tender offer."
6 Copland & Weston, supra, note 4.
7 A. Fleischer, Jr. & R.H. Mundheim, "Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer" (1967) 115
U. Pa. L. Rev. 317 at 317.
8 A share exchange offer would require a prospectus under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.
9 See, for example, R.G. Swanson, "S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers:
Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon" (1968) 5 Harv. J. Legis. 431 at 449; Fleischer and
Mundheim, supra, note 7 at 324; comments of Senator Williams, 11 Cong. Rec. 27248-49, 22
October 1965.
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in the corporation under new management, or in the hope of continuing
with a share in the corporation under the existing management.10
(iii) The shareholder can, by tendering early in the offer period,
have his shares locked-up such that he could not deal with the share
until the offeror, under the terms of the offer, decides whether to take
up the shares tendered.,
(iv) The shareholders need time to assess the information that should
be provided by the offeror.12
(v) In other contests for control, such as proxy contests or share
exchange offers, the offeror is required by the Securities Act of 1933
to make a disclosure of information. The lack of disclosure in cash takeover
bids represented a gap in federal securities regulation."
(vi) The practice of taking up tendered shares on a first-come, first-
served basis as a technique for encouraging the early tendering of shares
was considered to be inequitable by offeree (target) shareholders. As
well, it was seen as open to fraudulent use.,4
(vii) The practice of increasing the offer price as the offer period
progressed in order to attract the tendering of further shares and then
only paying the increased price on those shares tendered after the increase
in price, was seen as inequitable to the offeree shareholders."
The concerns expressed focused on the protection of target share-
holders and legislation which would protect target shareholders with
respect to these concerns was recommended.
In Ontario the Kimber Report recommended legislative measures
to protect target shareholders. The Report noted that:
the primary objective of any recommendations for legislation with respect to the
take-over bid transaction should be the protection of the bona fide interests of
the shareholders of the offeree company. Shareholders should have made available
to them, as a matter of law, sufficient up-to-date relevant information to permit
them to come to a reasoned decision as to the desirability of accepting a bid
for their shares.'6
Thus the response to the growing use of cash takeover bids was a concern
for protecting shareholders of target corporations.
10 See, for example, Swanson, supra, note 9 at 455; Fleischer and Mundheim, supra, note
7 at 326; and M.H. Cohen, "Tender Offers and Takeover Bids" (1968) 23 Bus. Law. 611 at 614.
11 See, for example, Fleischer and Mundheim, supra, note 7 at 327.
12 Ibid
13 See, for example, H.L. Sowards and J.S. Mofsky, "Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal
Securities Regulation" (1967) 41 St. John's L. Rev. 499 at 507.
14 See, for example, Sowards and Mofsky, ibi at 503.
15 See ibid at 515.
16 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Securifie Legislation in Ontario, (the "Kimber
Report"), March 1985 at para. 3.10.
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B. Law Relating to Takeover Bids
In Ontario, the legislative response to the concerns for protecting
target shareholders is in Part XIX of the Securities Act7 and Part IX
of the regulations under the Act. The legislation provides for: disclosure
requirements; bid delay periods; rights of withdrawal of tender by target
shareholders; and provisions for equal treatment of target shareholders.
There is similar legislation in other provinces and within the Canada
Business Corporations Act.t8
The disclosure requirements and the minimum bid period are the
major source of argument with respect to the economic efficiency of
takeover bid regulation. These requirements promote competitive bidding
for takeover targets by requiring information disclosure, which in turn
allows competing bidders to assess this information and make competing
bids during the required bid period.
Under the Ontario Securities Act, a "takeover bid" occurs when:
firstly, an "offeror",9 offers to buy the securities of a corporation from
security holders in Ontario; and secondly, the securities which are the
subject of the offer, when taken together with the offeror's presently
owned securities which are the subject of the offer, will exceed 20 per
cent of the outstanding voting securities of the company.2o Although an
important exemption is provided where the bid is made through a
recognized stock exchange, these exchanges also have disclosure require-
ments and bid delay period rules similar to those of the Securities Act.21
A takeover bid circular is to be sent to each holder in Ontario of
the security sought.22 The circular must reveal, among other things, the
identity of the offeror,23 and any material facts known to the offeror
that would reasonably be expected to affect the shareholders' decision
to accept or reject the offer.24 A minimum twenty-one day period must
elapse during which securities can be deposited pursuant to a takeover
17 Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466 and R.RIO. 910/80. Subsequent to the writing of this
article Part XIX was amended by S.O. 1987, c. 7.
IS Alberta Securities Act, S.A. 1981, c. S-61 Part 13, s. 131-145; B.C Securities Act, R.S.B.C.
1985, c. 23, Part 11, s. 74-99; Manitoba, The Securities Act R.S.M. 1970, c. 550, Part IX, s. 80-
99.1; Quebec SecuritiesAct, S.Q. 1982, c. 48, Title IV, s. 110-147, amended S.Q. 1984, c. 41, s. 40;
Saskatchewan, The Securities Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-42, Part X, s. 88-107; Canada Business
Corporations Act, S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, Part XVI, s. 187-99.
19 Ontario Securities Act, supra, note 17, s. 88(1)(h).
20 Ibid s. 88(l)(k). The threshold under the Canada Business Corporations Act, supra, note
18, s. 88(1)(h).
21 Ibid s. 88(2Xa).
22 Ibid. s. 89(1) 1. and s. 94(1).
23 Ibid s. 100.
24 Ontario Securities Act Regulations, Ont. Reg. 478/79 s. 165; Form 31, items 11 and 16.
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bid.-5 Securities deposited pursuant to a takeover bid can be withdrawn
at any time during the first ten days after the date of the takeover bid.26
Ontario Bill 156 would modify Part XIX of the Ontario Securities
Act. As far as the debate herein is concerned, it does not make a significant
change to the rules noted above. It would, however, increase the
withdrawal period to twenty-one days from the date of the takeover
bid and would provide for an early warning of potential takeovers. This
would tend to further encourage competitive bidding for takeover targets.27
The rules of the Toronto Stock Exchange require that offerors publish
a newspaper advertisement stating the details of the offer and the names
of the offeror and offeree companies.28 The offeror must also communicate
the information to each offeree shareholder in Canada.29 A book for
receipt of tenders will be opened after eleven clear trading days,3o but
this may be extended to twenty-one days in the event of a competing
bid by way of a takeover circular under the Securities Act.31 The Exchange
also reserves the right to extend the bid period in the event of a competing
bid through the facilities of the Exchange.z
In the U.S., which provided the context in which the debate reviewed
in this article occurred, the Williams Acp3 contains rules for cash takeover
bids similar to those in Ontario. The rules apply where the offeror will
end up owning in excess of 5 percent of the outstanding shares of the
class of shares sought.34 The disclosure requirements are similar to those
under the Ontario Securities Act,35 and the minimum period to complete
a bid is twenty days.36 Shareholders can withdraw tendered shares as
long as the bid remains open.3 7
25 Ibid Ontario Securities Act, s. 89(1) 2.
26 Ibid s. 89(1) 4.
27 Bill 156, 2d Session, 33rd Leg. Ont., s. 7 of which amends Part XIX of Act and provides
for these withdrawal rights in s. 94 of the Act. Subsequent to the writing of this article Bill 156
was enacted (S.O. 1987, c. 7).
28 T.S.E. by-law 23.02(9).
29 Ibid
30 T.S.E. By-law 23.05.
31 T.S.E. By-law 23.10.
32 T.S.E. By-law 23.09.
33 82 STAT. 455 (1968); 15 U.S.C., s. 78n(d).
34 15 U.S.C., s. 78n(d)(1).
35 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-4, 240.14d-6 and 240.14d-100.
36 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a).36.15 U.S.C.S., s. 78nd(d)(5).
37 17 C.F.R. s. 240.14d-7.
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Various defensive tactics by target managements can both extend
the bidding period and encourage competing bids. For instance, resorting
to legal action by claiming a violation of securities legislation, or stock
exchange rules could delay a takeover bid and allow further time for
competitive bidding. Seeking a "white knight"Ms directly encourages the
making of a competing bid. The position in Canada with respect to
takeover defenses appears to be that directors can take steps to defeat
a takeover bid if they have a bona fide and reasonable belief that it
is in the best interests of the corporation to do so.39 Under this test it
is likely that a takeover defence that has the effect of raising the takeover
premium will be permitted. In the U.S., takeover defenses have often
been permitted under the business judgment rule.40
The feasibility of successful takeover defenses is enhanced by
minimum bid period legislation. These rules increase the time during
which a takeover defence can be mounted. Thus, takeover bid legislation
and the permissive approach to defensive tactics work in tandem to
promote competitive bidding.
C. Motives for Takeovers
There are a number of reasons for takeovers. Takeover bid legislation
should be considered in the context of its effect on various takeover
motivations. A summary of theories on the motives behind takeovers
is presented below.,1
(i) Inefficient management
The target corporation's management may be inefficient. It may
not be performing in the interests of shareholders to the extent which
an acquirer could. Target management may not be as effective, as
38 A "white knight" is a competing bidder sought by target management often to avoid the
prospect of target management being replaced.
39 See Teck Corporation Ltd v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (B.S.S.C.), Howard Smith
Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd, [1974] 1 All E.R. 1126 (P.C.).
40 See, for example, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.) at 293-95, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos, v. Care Corp. v. Internorth Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir 1980) at 701-704; Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir 1980) at 294, cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981).
41 See Copland and Weston, supra, note 4 at 561-69, and see Bebchuk, "The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers," supra, note 1 at 1030-34.
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managers, as some other group might be, or target management might
just be inept.42
(ii) Synergy
A synergy is present where the value of combining two corporations
is greater than the sum of the value of the corporations acting separately.
(iii) Market power
Increased market power from a combination of two firms in the
same industry can create greater profits. Although the value of the
combined enterprise will be greater than the sum of the values of the
individual enterprises, and will thus present a synergistic gain, it is useful
to distinguish the market power takeover motivation from other synergistic
motivations. Pure market power motivations will be associated with a
social loss while other synergistic gains will generally be associated with
a social gain.
(iv) Tax considerations
Tax savings may result from a takeover by, for instance, permitting
the business losses or capital losses of one firm to be applied against
income or capital gains of another firm.
(v) Undervaluation
If a target is undervalued in the market, the acquirer can gain by
buying and holding the undervalued target shares until they are properly
valued.
(vi) Empire building or managerialism
Management may seek to acquire other firms to enhance the size
of their firm, leading to increased prestige and compensation.
(vii) Looting
The acquirer may want to acquire sufficient control of the target
to be able to purchase assets of the target through an affiliate at
substantially less than fair market value.
42 An inefficient management may be inept in some absolute sense in that anyone could do
better or it may be that there is a relatively more efficient management team. A management
may be inefficient not only in the way they manage the productive capacity of the assets but
may also be inefficient by consuming an excessive level of perquisites or inefficiently controlling
the level of perquisites (in other words, incurring excessive agency costs - see M. Jensen & W.
Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure"
(1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305).
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(viii) Hubris
The acquirer may be mistaken about the value that acquiring the
target might provide.3
The inefficient management, synergy, and undervaluation motives
for takeovers are worthwhile in terms of allocative efficiency because
they cause assets to be put to more highly valued uses.44 The market
power motivation is allocatively inefficient and the tax and empire building
motivations may lead to allocative inefficiency and otherwise incur
wasteful transactions costs without any compensating gains.45
D. A Summary of Empirical Evidence on Takeovers
The available empirical evidence on takeovers underlies the theo-
retical debate on the economics of takeover bid regulation. Very briefly
stated, empirical evidence on takeovers indicates, among other things,
the following:46
(i) Shares of target firms have significant positive gains of, on
average, 30% beginning from about one month prior to a takeover, while
shares of the bidder gain 4% on average;47
43 The hubris hypothesis is described by R. Roll in "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers" (1986) 59 J. Bus. 197. The hypothesis claims that since the actual underlying value
of the target is not known with certainty, observations about the value of the target will be distributed
around the underlying value. An observation that the target is undervalued may just be an observation
from the high end of the distribution and thus could simply represent an overestimation of the
value of the target. An acquirer who does not have much experience with valuing and bidding
for targets may not properly adjust its estimate of the value of a target for this tendency to overestimate
the value. The acquisition may then occur not for any gains that can be achieved but simply on
the basis of a mistaken belief that the target is undervalued.
44 The correction of an undervaluation corrects the market price which affects the allocation
of resources. By correcting the market price the allocation of resources will be improved. However,
it may be that the private gain from correcting an undervaluation will exceed the social gain (see
the text accompanying note 96).
45 The sources of social gains from mergers are noted in D.W. Leebron, "Games Corporations
Play: A Theory of Tender Offers" (1986) 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 153 at 204.
46 Summaries of the evidence on mergers and takeover bids are provided by M.C. Jensen
& R.S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence" (1983) 11 J. Fin.
Econ. 5; P. Halpern, "Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event
Studies Applied to Acquisitions" (1983) 38 J. Fin. 29; and M. Jensen, "Takeovers: Folklore and
Science" (1984) Harv. Bus. Rev. 109.
47 See Jensen & Ruback, supra, note 46, where an average is taken over studies by P. Dodd
& R. Ruback, "Tender Offers and Shareholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis" (1977) 5 J. Fin.
Econ. 351; D. Kummer & R. Hoffmeister, "Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers" (1978)
33 J. Fin 505; M. Bradley, "Interfirn Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control" (1980)
53 J. Bus. 345; G. Jarrell & M. Bradley, "The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations
of Cash Tender Offers" (1980) 23 J. L. & Econ. 371.
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(ii) Target firms perform poorly for, on average, two years prior
to a takeover.,8 This is most consistent with an inefficient management
motivation for takeovers;49
(iii) Acquirers often perform well before takeovers;50
(iv) The enactment of cash takeover bid legislation in the u.s. has
increased tender offer premiums by approximately 32 to 53%. Gains to target shareholders
have increased, while gains to acquirer shareholders have decreased.51
These results are based primarily on studies of U.S. data. Comparable studies
have yet to be published in Canada.2
This brief review of the concerns which prompted takeover bid
legislation, the relevant legal rules, the motives for takeovers, and some
of the empirical evidence relating to takeovers, provides a background
for the review of the debate which follows.
III. REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE ON THE ECONOMICS
OF TAKEOVERS
In this Part, the main arguments made in the debate over the economic
efficiency of legal rules relating to takeovers, will be reviewed and
commented upon.
A. The Argument for a Passive Target Management Response and
Avoidance of Competitive Bidding
It has been argued that the permissive approach to target management
responses to takeover bids and the delay and disclosure rules of takeover
bid legislation are inappropriate because they discourage beneficial
takeovers by encouraging competitive bidding for targets.s3
The argument proceeds as follows. Where a corporation's shares
are widely held it will be difficult to replace an inefficient management.
The cost to any one shareholder of organizing a dispersed group of
shareholders to replace management through the proxy mechanism are
48 See Dodd & Ruback, supra, note 47, and Kummer & Hoffmeister, supra, note 47.
49 See Dodd & Ruback, supra, note 47, and Kummer & Hoffmeister, supra, note 47.
50 Ibi
51 See Jarrell and Bradley, "The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers" (1980) 23 J.L. & Econ. 371.
52 There is one published study on mergers in Canada by B.E. Eckbo, "Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control" (1986) 19 Can. L Econ. 326.
53 An argument as to the value of takeovers was made by Manne, "Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control" (1965) 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110. The main proponents of the argument against
takeover bid legislation and target management defensive tactics which promote competitive bidding
are Easterbrook and Fischel whose arguments have been made in the articles listed supra in note
1.
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great. The gain is shared by all shareholders. Consequently, a relatively
small share of the gain accrues to the shareholder who incurs the costs
of organizing the dispersed group. Rather than incur the costs of organizing
others, most shareholders can be expected to free-ride on another's
organizing efforts. A takeover overcomes this by permitting the acquirer
to reap a large share of the gains of replacing inefficient management,
without incurring the costs of organizing shareholders. Takeovers are
thus a useful mechanism for monitoring management inefficiency.
The empirical evidence suggests that a significant number of
takeovers are motivated by the desire to replace inefficient management.54
Further, since other motivations for takeovers are generally in the interest
of both acquirer and target management, the takeover is more likely
to occur in a friendly manner. Takeovers of inefficient management are
thus likely to be hostile. The premium over the market price in a takeover
indicates that there are private and social gains from the takeover.5s Where
defenses in response to takeover bids are successful, they prevent the
potential social gains from being realized. The minimum bid periods,
disclosure rules, and defenses, permit competing bids for the target.
Competing bids effectively create an auction and raise the takeover
premium. This reduces the acquirer's gains and thus reduces the number
of takeover bids and the total number of socially beneficial takeovers.
Auctions, or potential auctions, discourage the search for targets.
The first bidder incurs costs in searching for the target. In compliance
with disclosure requirements, the bid discloses much information which
the acquirer has paid to find.56 Subsequent bidders get the benefit of
this information without incurring the costs, and the minimum bid period
rules permit them to respond with competing bids. This raises the takeover
premium and consequently reduces the potential gain to the first bidder.
With the reduced gain to first bidders, there is less incentive to incur
54 See note 48. The evidence shows declining cumulative average residuals (which measure
the stock price effects related to the takeover event after removing market effects and the effects
of events other than the takeover) up to two years prior to the takeover event. Declining cumulative
average residuals are only consistent with the inefficient management motivation for takeovers
and thus indicate that a significant number of takeovers are motivated by the gains from the
replacement of inefficient management.
55 Empirical evidence suggests that there are net positive gains from takeovers - see M.C.
Jensen & R.S. Ruback, "The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence" (1983) 11
J. Fin. Econ. 5 at 22. The evidence, however, is not unambiguous - see R. Roll, supra, note
43 at 202-06 where evidence on the gains from takeovers is reviewed. More recent evidence suggests
that there are net gains from takeovers - see M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Han Kim, "Synergetic
Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and
Acquiring Firms" [unpublished, University of Michigan, July 1986] at 45.
56 The key piece of information revealed is the identity of the target. The size of the possible
gain may also be revealed by other information that takeover-bid legislation requires the bidder
to reveal.
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the initial costs of searching for targets. When less search for potential
targets takes place, fewer socially beneficial takeovers will occur. In other
words, monitoring management inefficiency by takeovers will be reduced.
To achieve the optimal level of investment in information about takeover
targets, and consequently the optimal level of monitoring of management
inefficiency by takeovers, the marginal cost of investment in information
should equal the marginal gain to society from the investment. In order
to achieve this, bidders, who make the decision on investment in
information, must be given as much of the gains from takeovers as
possible.7
The argument against auctions suggests that takeover bid legislation
such as the Williams Act should be repealed.58 The argument also suggests
that target managers should respond to tender offers passively; that is,
they should not engage in defensive tactics in response to tender offers.59
B. Arguments in Favour of Competitive Bidding and Responses to the
Arguments
A number of arguments have been made in favour of creating auctions
in takeover bids through takeover bid legislation and takeover bid
defensive tactics. These arguments are presented below. Each section
presents an argument in favour of auctions in takeovers, followed by
responses by those opposed to such auctions. The author's comments
follow the presentation of the argument and responses in each section.
1. The trivial effect of competitive bidding
(a) Costs and returns of searches
Competitive bidding, it is argued, does not significantly decrease
returns from searching for targets since:
(i) The bidder can buy shares before making a bid and capture
a substantial portion of the potential gain on those shares whether or
not the bidder is ultimately successful in acquiring the target;60
57 This is demonstrated by Professor Schwartz, supra, note I at 236-37. Professor Schwartz
shows that less search will occur if the gains to acquirers are reduced under three assumptions:
(1) search costs are non-decreasing as search intensity increases and are not affected by takeover-
bid legislation; (2) as search intensity increases more potential targets are identified but at a decreasing
rate; and (3) the gains to acquirers from identifying targets are less under an auction.
58 See Fischel, supra, note 1 at 24-26; Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note I at 15-17; Schwartz
I, supra, note I at 230.
59 See Easterbrook & Fischel 1, supra, note 1, esp. at 1201-1204.
60 Bebchuk, supra, note 1 at 1035 and Gilson I, supra, note 1 at 871.
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(ii) The target may afford greater synergy or managerial efficiency
gains to the bidder than it would to other bidders. The bidder will therefore
be left with a surplus after the competitive bidding process;61
(iii) The first bidder has an advantage by having had more time
to study the target. This gives the bidder an informational advantage
and perhaps a strategic advantage over other bidders;62
(iv) The search costs for bidders are small because searching is
done by investment bankers whose fees are often less than one per cent
of the target's value and largely contingent on the success of the acquisition
attempt.63
Further, if the number of potential targets identified diminishes as
search efforts increase, then increasing the returns from searches may
not significantly increase search efforts.64 Consequently, it may be that
competitive bidding has very little effect on the frequency, and thus the
monitoring effect, of takeovers. If an increase in the returns from search
is desirable, it is argued that this can be accomplished by raising the
percentage of the target's stock which may be purchased without
disclosure.-
Two responses have been made to this argument. The first questions
the claim that a bidder's search costs are small. It is argued that:
management time spent searching is an opportunity cost (which includes
the value of other projects foregone); many firms must be searched to
find the one on which a bid is ultimately made; capital must be held
at the ready; and the first bidder's capital is committed for the longest
period.66 First bidders are also subject to higher risk since they do not
have access to internal documents of the target while one or more
subsequent bidders may gain such access.67 This causes first bidders to
win when they bid too high, or, drive the price up when they bid too
10w.68 Thus, it is not clear that the search costs of first bidders are small.
61 Ibid Bebchuk at 1036. The surplus would occur because the winning bidder would only
have to just outbid the second-highest bidder.
62 Ibid
63 Ibid at 1036-37 and Gilson, supra, note 1 at 870. No evidence is presented to support
the claim that investment bankers do most of the searching for targets.
64 Ibid Bebchuk at 1037-38. In other words, there may be diminishing returns from searching
for targets since as more search is done and targets are identified there are likely to be fewer
targets remaining and the rate at which targets will be identified will go down.
65 Ibid Bebchuk at 1038.
66 Easterbrook and Fischel I1, supra, note 1 at 6.
67 The target may attract a competing bidder (a "white knight") to promote competitive bidding
and raise the takeover premium, or, the target may attract a friendly acquirer to prevent a takeover
by a hostile first-bidder who would replace target management To encourage a competing bidder
to enter, or to favour a friendly competing bidder, the target may reduce the risk to a competing
bidder by allowing it access to internal target documents so that it can acquire better information
at low cost.
68 Ibid
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The second response to the claim that competitive bidding does
not significantly reduce returns from the search process is that the ratio
of available gains to search costs is irrelevant. The takeover bid is a
case of protecting property rights in information in order to offer an
incentive to produce that information. The efficient solution requires that
the marginal social costs and marginal social gains of producing the
information be equal. In other words, it is the marginal, not the total,
gains and costs which are relevant. The inability to appropriate the full
value of the information will lead to insufficient production of information,
which, in turn, will reduce the number of takeover bids and the
effectiveness of takeovers in monitoring managers.69
Such is the state of the argument on the relationship between search
costs and returns. Unfortunately, the average of total costs and returns
of searching for and identifying a target are unresolved empirical questions.
These questions, however, are not crucial. The important question is the
effect of the premium on investing in the search for targets and the
consequent frequency of takeovers. This question cannot be answered
by examining total gains and costs since it is the gains and costs at
the margin which affect the level of investment in search70
(b) Takeover premiums and the frequency of takeovers
Another argument in favour of auctions is that preventing them
is only justified if it increases the value of target shares. The value of
target shares will depend on the price of such shares in the event there
is no takeover, plus, a premium for the gain in the event of a takeover.
The gain in the event of a takeover depends on the probability of a
takeover, multiplied by the takeover premium if a takeover occurs. Thus,
it is argued that the value of target shares depends on the effect of auctions
on both the probability or frequency of takeovers, and the takeover
premium. Preventing auctions is only jusfified if the reduction in the
takeover premiums is outweighed by the increase in the frequency of
takeovers.71 In other words, if for a given reduction in takeover premiums
there is a less than proportionate increase in the frequency of takeovers,
then auctions will not reduce takeover frequency to a point that outweighs
their positive effect on premiums.72
69 Ibid at 4-6.
70 The appropriate empirical analysis would be one which attempts to get some estimate of
the marginal effect of a change in takeover premiums on the frequency of takeovers.
71 See Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 1038.
72 The "positive" effect which Professor Bebchuk refers to is the increase in gains to target
shareholders. Target shareholders would gain from auctions if the percentage reduction in the
frequency of takeovers (and thus the percentage reduction in the probability of a takeover) is less
than the percentage gain in the premium they would receive upon a takeover.
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This argument, it is said, implicitly assumes that investors can identify
potential targets in advance of bids and thus will be interested in high
premiums.3 If investors cannot identify potential targets in advance, 7
they cannot incorporate higher takeover premiums into the stock price
of these targets. Further, to the extent shareholders have diversified
holdings, they will tend to hold both target and bidder stock and thus
cannot gain from increased premiums, since what they gain on target
shares will be matched by losses on bidder shares.-s
The following comments can be made with respect to the alleged
positive effect of auctions on takeover premiums. The argument, by
considering the balance between takeover frequency and premiums,
focuses on an auction's effect on target shareholder wealth. Although
ex ante target shareholder wealth will generally be consistent with social
welfare, increasing takeover premiums may not be consistent with social
welfare, if they cause investment in relatively inefficient uses of assets.
If shareholders can identify potential targets, if increased takeover
premiums do not significantly affect takeover frequency to the extent
that target shareholders gain from increased premiums, and, if a significant
73 Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at 8. Easterbrook and Fischel support this claim
by noting that target share prices do not rise until very shortly before a takeover bid is announced.
They quote Bradley, supra, note 47. It may be, however, that the share price already implicitly
includes a value for some probability of takeover. Testing for whether a firm can be identified
as having a greater than average potential of becoming a target may not lend itself to an event
study.
74 Bebchuk claims corporations can be identified as more likely to become either acquirers
or targets. He notes evidence of characteristics of targets quoting A. Singh, "Take-Overs, Economic
Natural Selection, and the Theory of the Firm: Evidence from the Post-War United Kingdom
Experience" (1975) 85 Econ. . 497 and Stevens, "Financial Characteristics of Merged Firms:
A Multivariate Analysis" (1973) 8 L Fin. & Quant. Anal. 149. These characteristics can provide
a means of assessing a firm's likelihood of being taken over. He also notes there are firms with
announced acquisition programs which are more likely to be acquirers. See Bebchuk If, supra,
note 1 at 28 and note 15.
There are several recent studies that develop models to identify targets - see for example:
J. Hasbrouck, "The Characteristics of Takeover Targets: q and Other Measures" (1985) 9 J. Banking
Fin. 357; S. Schwartz, "Factors Affecting the Probability of Being Acquired: Evidence for the United
States" (1982) 92 Eco. J. 391; R. Harris et aL, "Characteristics of Acquired Firms: Fixed and
Random Coefficient Probit Analyses" (1982) Southern Eco. J. 164; J.W. Bartley & C.M. Borden,
"Replacement Cost-Adjusted Valuation Ratio as a Discriminator Among Takeover Target and
Non-Target Firms" (1986) 38 J. Eco. Bus. 41; A. Belkeoui, "Financial Ratios as Predictors of
Canadian Takeovers" (1978) 5 J. Bus. Fin. Acctng 93. With some exceptions these models explain
only some of the variance and are generally poor predictors. Those that do show success in predicting
takeover targets appear to be successful due to the use of non-random samples to estimate the
models combined with non-random samples to do prediction tests of the models and arbitrary
cut-off rates for the probability of the firm being a target - see KG. Palepu, "Predicting Takeover
Targets: A Methodological and Empirical Analysis" (1986) 8 J. Acc. Econ. 3.
75 Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at 8-9. This assumes there are no gains from takeovers.
In fact shareholders may gain on average if there are gains from takeovers (see, supra, note 55).
Any reduction in the frequency of takeovers would mean a loss of these gains and thus shareholders
holding portfolios balanced between acquirers and targets would lose on average if the frequency
of takeovers was reduced.
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number of takeovers are motivated by a desire to replace inefficient
management, then increasing target premiums would increase the value
of the target and thus encourage investment in firms with inefficient
management.76 Such an incentive could hardly be considered desirable.
Even when analyzing the problem from the point of view of target
shareholder wealth, the argument ignores the effect of increased frequency
of takeovers on the price of target shares, when targets are not taken
over. In other words, by focusing on the effect on premiums, the argument
ignores the effect of the increased threat of takeovers on the prices of
shares generally. From the target shareholder's point of view, the takeover
frequency effect which must be weighed against reduced premiums is
not just the takeover frequency itself, but also the effect this increased
threat has on the price of target shares when no takeover materializes.
The argument in favour of auctions, and response to it, raise the
following empirical questions:
(i) To what extent can investors identify potential targets in advance?
(ii) For a given percentage reduction in takeover premiums is there
a lesser or greater percentage reduction in the frequency of takeovers?
(iii) What is the effect of a change in takeover frequency on the
price of shares generally and on the shares of potential targets?
The first of these questions is not crucial to social welfare concerns,
given that gains by target shareholders are simply wealth transfers.77
However, the second and third questions are important in determining
the effects of a change in the legal rules relating to takeovers. This is
important for identifying the cost of trading off a higher premium for
some other benefit. For instance, if there are benefits in increased
76 The price of a share in the market should represent the value of the entitlement to the
cash flows management can generate. When shareholders can expect a premium in excess of this
value then it will be worthwhile to hold the shares even though their price is in excess of the
net present value of the entitlement to cash flows management generates from the assets of the
potential target. This premium will permit management to continue managing assets in an inefficient
way. This is because normally more efficient managements will generate higher cash flows and
will thus derive higher net present values from their investments. The more efficient managements
can pay more for the assets related to a given investment than can less efficient managements.
However, if there is an identifiable and expected takeover premium for firms with less efficient
managements, then a less efficient management can pay a price competing with that paid by more
efficient managements and which is in excess of the amount justified by the cash flows the less
efficient management would generate. This negative net present value investment would not have
a negative effect on the stock price to the extent it is compensated for by the expected takeover
premium. To the extent less efficient managements can compete successfully with more efficient
managements for assets there will be a misallocation of assets.
77 Although social welfare may be affected by such wealth transfers it would be difficult to
construct a distributive theory supporting such wealth transfers. To support a distributive theory
in favour of target shareholders, it would presumably be necessary to distinguish the profile of
target shareholders from the profile of acquirer shareholders and then show that persons who tend
to be target shareholders are deserving of a wealth transfer in their favour. The first step will
be difficult given that it is not clear that shareholders can identify targets in advance.
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premiums, these benefits might be obtained at relatively low cost if the
premium increase has little effect on the frequency of takeovers and
the effect of a change in takeover frequency on share prices is small.
(c) Auctions increase the returns from the search for takeover targets
Professor Gilson has argued that for some producers of information
concerning potential takeover targets,78 competitive bidding may increase
the return on investment in search. Gilson gives the following example:79
Search costs ......................................... = $2.5 million
Current share price ................................. = $50 per share
Share price upon takeover .......................... = $120 per share
Successful bid price without competitive bidding .... = $100 per share
Proportion of shares that can be purchased before
the takeover bid rules apply ........................ = 10%
Number of target shares ............................ = 1 million
The costs in a takeover can be broken down into information or search
costs (the costs in identifying a potential target), and implementation
costs (the costs of securing control and implementing the value-increasing
strategy). Assuming the information producer can avoid competitive
bidding, if the information producer's strategy is to invest in both search
and implementation then the investment costs $97.5 million. This breaks
down into $2.5 million for search costs, $5 million to buy 10% of the
target's shares in the market, and $90 million to buy the remaining 90%
of the target's shares at $100 per share. The return is $120 million (the
value of the target subsequent to the takeover). The gain is $22.5 million,
for a return on investment of approximately 23%.
The information producer might adopt an alternative strategy of
investing in search but leaving the implementation to another party. The
information could be passed along to another company after buying 10%
of the target's stock. Upon completion of a successful bid at $100 per
share, the information producer would get $10 million on the sale of
100,000 shares, with an investment of $7.5 million ($2.5 million for
search costs and $5 million to buy 100,000 shares at $50 per share).
This results in a return on investment of 33.3%. The information producer
could also buy 10% of the target's shares and encourage competitive
bidding by making the information public.8o The ensuing auction would
increase the price for the takeover to $120 per share. The information
78 Gilson I, supra, note 1 at 53; see also Gilson I, supra, note 1 at 872, note 187.
79 Gilson IL supra, note I at 53.
80 This assumes the information can be credibly revealed.
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producer would then realize a return of $12 million on an investment
of $7.5 million - for a return on investment of 60%.
Information production and implementation skills, it is argued, may
not always be present in one entity. There is likely to be specialization
in these activities.si Where there is specialization, information producers
would prefer competitive bidding, while implementers would prefer none.
Not having an auction, according to the above analysis, may reduce
the returns from a search for targets and thus reduce investments in
information to a less than optimal level.82
The information producer might sell the information rather than
encourage competitive bidding. The sale, in terms of the example above,
could be for some part of the $20 million gain. This would increase
the return to more than $10 million and perhaps to more than $12 million,
thus permitting a return on investment greater than 60%.83
The problem in both encouraging competitive bidding and selling
information, it is argued, is verification of the information passed on.8,
How the information producer deals with this will depend on the relative
costs of verification. Under the sale alternative, verification by bonding
(such as making investments in reputation) could be used. Under a
competitive bidding alternative, which may be used either by those who
have not made prior investments in reputation or by those without the
capital and time to adopt other verification techniques, the competitive
bidding process can verify the information. The bidding process, it is
argued, verifies the information because the announcement of the first
bid creates an incentive for target management to select the ultimate
acquirer (for instance by selecting a "white knight"), and to verify the
information to that acquirer by allowing it access to the target's internal
documents.85 So, depending on the relative costs of verifying their
information, some information producers may benefit from auctions while
others may not.86
The response to the claim that auctions increase search returns
counters that the claim has a number of problems. Firstly, it has been
noted that searching for potential targets and implementing an acquisition
are complementary inputs.87 If the demand for takeover implementation
81 No evidence is offered to show that there is specialization.
8 Gilson II, supra, note 1 at 54.
83 Easterbrook & Fischel IL supra, note 1 at 20.
84 Gilson II, supra, note 1 at 57.
85 See Gilson II, supra, note 1 at 59-61, note 22.
86 Ibid at 57-60.
87 Easterbrook & Fischel IL supra, note 1 at 18.
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decreases, the demand for its complement, searching for targets, will
also go down.88 The claim that competitive bidding may increase search
returns appears to argue that as the price for targets rises, and consequently
the demand for targets falls, there is a greater demand for information
about potential targets. This, it is argued, is an unlikely result.89
Secondly, Gilson's example has separated the two types of invest-
ments but has not disaggregated the returns on investment. In the example,
the return on the production of information and purchase of 10% of
the target shares is 60%, whether the information producer encourages
competitive bidding or implements the takeover itself. In both cases, the
value of the 100,000 shares purchased is $12 million and the investment
in the production of the information and purchase of 100,000 shares
is $7.5 million. The information producer could then consider a separate
investment in implementation. This would involve a cost of $90 million
(according to the example) and the return on 900,000 shares purchased
in implementing the takeover would be $108 million (900,000 times
the $120 per share value ultimately realized). This would result in a
return on investment of 20%. The combined return of searching and
implementing is, as noted above, 23%.9o However, in both the strategy
of searching without implementing and the strategy of searching and
implementing, the return on investment from searching is the same (60%
in the example).
Thirdly, the implicit assumption in the example is that neither the
information producer nor the implementer have a comparative advantage
in identifying potential targets. Further, to compare returns, the risks
must be the same for the two types of activity.9' Thus, no one would
spend the $90 million to implement the transaction but would continue
to invest in information production to earn the higher return at the same
risk. The example does not represent an equilibrium.92
With respect to verification of information under a sale, as opposed
to competitive bidding, it has been noted that vertical integration of search
and implementation is one solution to the verification problem.93 The
88 Cars and gasoline are often used as an example of complements. If the demand for one
goes down then the demand for the other will, ceteris paribus, also go down.
89 Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at 18.
90 The investment portfolio would have 7.5m/97.5m of the $97.5 million investment invested
at a return of 60% and 90m/97.5m of the $97.5 million investment invested at a return of 20%
for an average return of (7.5/97.5) x 60% + (90/97.5) x 20% - 23%. Easterbrook and Fischel
appear to note this problem in Gilson's analysis, see Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at
20.
91 The risks of information production and implementation maybe different, but Gilson's example
does not deal with this.
92 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra, note 1 at 20.
93 Ibid at 19-20.
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vertically integrated information producer and takeover implementer
would gain more without competitive bidding and would thus engage
in more monitoring of inefficient managements through takeovers. But
even if competitive bidding increases returns to information producers,
it does not mean that legal rules which ensure competitive bidding are
necessary or appropriate. Information producers should be left with a
choice of verification procedures so they can choose the technique which
minimizes their costs. If an information producer prefers to promote
competitive bidding, it can do so, it is argued, without legislative
assistance.9, However, it may be that information producers cannot
effectively encourage competitive bidding without the assistance of legal
rules. Even if this is the case, it does not mean that mandatory legal
rules are necessary. The information producer should be able to decide
if it wishes to adhere to these rules.
The information producer seeking an auction would require some
form of rule to prevent a subsequent bidder from precluding a further
auction by making a bid with a very short bid period. However, the
legal rule could simply be a requirement that the information producer's
rules be followed. With such a rule the information producer could set
up the auction to verify its information in the most efficient manner.
An available set of auction rules might reduce transaction costs to the
information producer by reducing the costs of designing and promulgating
the auction rules. However, the information producers should be able
to opt out when they find it worthwhile to incur the transaction costs
in order to provide for an auction that best suits them.95
2. A social welfare perspective
(a) Excessive search for targets
From the standpoint of the socially efficient level of investment
engaged in by actors in the market, it is necessary that the social gains
and costs equal the private gains and costs. If net private gains exceed
net social gains for a particular activity, then there will be an incentive
for individuals to overinvest. It has been argued that private gains may
exceed social gains in takeovers leading to overinvestment in takeover
94 Ibid at 20.
95 For instance, legislation might provide that the takeover is voidable by the information
producer if the information producer's rules are not followed. The legislation might require the
information producer, at the time of identifying the target, to submit rules for bidding on the target
to a securities commission and require the dissemination of those rules in financial news media.
The legislation might provide a set of default rules which would apply to the extent the information
producer did not opt out of the legislative set of rules. This could lower the costs to the information
producer of providing a set of rules.
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activity.96 Four sources of this divergence in social and private gains
are given97
(i) A takeover may be motivated by a prior undervaluation of the
target. The acquisition may correct the price of the shares in the market
but would not improve the efficiency of the use of the corporation's
assets.
(ii) The gain may come from tax savings such that the acquisition
has little or no affect on the efficiency of the use of the underlying
assets.
(iii) The gain may come from enhanced market power in terms
of gains from monopoly or the potential for cartelization. The result
would be a social loss.
(iv) The acquirer's management may be motivated by a preference
for expansion (empire building or managerialism). If this is the sole
motivation, the expansion will not increase the efficient use of assets
and may even decrease efficiency.
None of these motivations for takeovers would produce gains for
society as a whole. Instead they would give private gains to the bidder
who would consequently be induced to incur the costs of engaging in
such takeovers.
The response to the claim that private gains may exceed social gains
counters each of the four sources of divergence noted above.
(i) Prior undervaluation of target
Takeovers that correct the prior undervaluation of a target, it is
argued, do produce a social gain in that the correction of the price leads
to investment incentives that are more allocatively efficient.98 Secondly,
there will be very few exploitable undervaluations since sophisticated
investors in the market will act to take advantage of undervaluations
long before a takeover bid could be made.99 Thirdly, if a bidder could
identify inside information indicating that a target was undervalued, target
management would have an incentive to reveal the information.0oo Further,
96 Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 1046-47.
97 Ibid at 1047.
98 Bebchuk replies to this saying that the value to society of a price correction of an undervalued
target is smaller than the amount of the undervaluation leaving the private gain as still larger
than the social gain - see Bebchuk II, supra, note 1 at 36. An undervaluation will cause the
return required on sources of finance to be greater than it otherwise would be and this can deter
investment in projects that would have a positive net present value.
99 Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at 10-12.
100 See Schwartz I, supra, note I at 241.
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empirical evidence suggests that takeover bids are generally not motivated
by attempts to capitalize on asymmetries in information.oi
However, the claim that takeovers are motivated by a prior under-
valuation of the target is said to depend not on the existing level of
search for undervalued targets that would occur under the current
legislative regime which promotes auctions, but on the level of search
for undervalued targets that would occur under a non-auction legal
regime.-o2 Under a non-auction regime, the gain from such search will
be higher since the acquirer will be able to capture all of the gain associated
with the undervaluation. Although there may be a social gain from search,
not all of the gain to the acquirer will be a social gain.03
The claim that takeovers are often motivated by an undervaluation
acknowledges that if the target is undervalued and there is a threat of
a takeover, target managers will have an incentive to release information
to cause an upward revaluation of the target.o However, there may be
inside information which managers are not able to reveal to the market
in a credible way, especially in the short time available during a "Saturday
Night Special",05 bid for the target. Although the management of the
acquirer may not be able to reveal the information to the market any
101 See M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Han Kim, "The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers:
Information or Synergy" (1983) 11 J. Fin. Econ. 183. Cumulative average residuals (see note 54)
would be expected not to decline after an unsuccessful takeover that was based solely on the
target being undervalued. The takeover attempt would release the information to the market and
the shares would be revalued by the market. The empirical evidence shows that the cumulative
average residuals fall after an unsuccessful takeover attempt, implying that takeovers are not generally
due to an undervaluation. Although it is still possible that some takeovers are motivated by an
undervaluation, the undervaluation would have to be significant to justify the transactions costs
of a takeover which have been estimated to average approximately 13% of the value of the target
taken over. (See R. Smiley, "The Effect of the Williams Amendment and Other Factors on Transactions
Costs in Tender Offers" (1975) 3 Ind. Org. Rev. 138.)
102 See Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 257-58.
103 ]bid at 257. See also Bebchuk L supra, note 1 at 1033 and Bebchuk II, supra, note 1
at 36. However, one would expect competition in the search for information. This would drive
the returns down to a normal level for the risk undertaken. With competitive returns it is not
so clear that the private gains from investment in information will exceed the social gains. Further,
there are clearly investors who benefit (or "free-ride") on the information revealed by the efforts
of others. Such free-riding in information suggests that there may be a suboptimal level of investment
in information. In short, it is not clear that the investment in information under a non-auction
regime would be excessive even if the investment in information only sought to identify
undervaluations.
104 See Schwartz I, supra, note 1 at 241.
105 A "Saturday Night special" is the jargon used for a bid which gives a very short duration
between the making of the takeover bid and the expiry time for the bid. For instance, the bid
might be made on a Saturday night with an expiry time sometime on the following Monday.
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more credibly than management of the target,,06 the information will
presumably eventually find its way to the market.07
Further, it is argued that auctions will deter the search for undervalued
targets more than the search for efficiency gains from takeovers.08 This,
it is argued, is because acquirers are likely to differ in the amount of
efficiency gains they can produce. The winning bidder, bidding just
marginally more than the value to the second-highest bidder,09 will profit
from the difference between the value of the target in its hands and
the value of the target in the hands of the second-highest bidder. However,
where the takeover is motivated by an undervaluation, the gains to various
bidders will presumably be the same. In such a case there will be no
difference between the value to the winning bidder and the value to
the second-highest bidder and thus there will be virtually no gain to
the winning bidder.,io
In spite of these claims it still seems unlikely that the undervaluation
motive for takeovers will cause a significant overinvestment in search.
The empirical evidence on the significance of undervaluation as a motive
for takeovers and the high cost of takeovers relative to the potential
gain from undervaluation likely to be available in an efficient capital
market suggests that the undervaluation motive is unlikely to be very
significant."' Further, it is not clear that an undervaluation motive for
a takeover would lead to an excessive level of search even under a non-
auction regime." 2 Thus, the undervaluation motive for takeovers is unlikely
to be a significant source of overinvestment in search.
106 See Schwartz I, supra, note 1 at 242 where it is suggested that if target management
can not reveal the information to the market in a credible way then acquirer management will
not be able to do so either.
107 See Bebchuk III, supra, note I at 260-61.
108 Ibid at 256.
'09 In an open ascending bid auction the winning bidder will be able to win by paying just
marginally more than the amount the last competing bidder was willing to bid.
110 Bebchuck mH, supra, note 1 at 262. See also Bebchuk II, supra, note 1 at 35. This argument
by Bebchuk does not seem to be quite correctly stated since bidders will have different expectations
as to the extent of the undervaluation of a target in any given takeover such that there will be
a difference between the value the winning bidder expects to derive from acquiring the target
and the value the second-highest bidder expects to derive. The acquirer in any given takeover
can expect gains if it has adjusted properly for the tendency to overbid (the "winner's curse,"
see the discussion of the hubris hypothesis in note 43). However, the question for the searcher
is what the expected gain from engaging in search will be. The expected gain from engaging
in search may be lower where the gains from takeovers are due to undervaluations since the searcher
will know that on average it will not value the target any more highly than other bidders and
will thus not have gains as great as would be the case where it could derive a higher synergistic
or other gain from acquiring a target than could other bidders.
M See note 101.
112 See note 103.
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(ii) Tax and market power motives
It has been argued that "these social costs reflect policy determi-
nations better dealt with by adjusting tax and antitrust law than by
modifying the laws concerning tender offers.""3 In Canada, the recently
enacted Competition Act, with its efficiency defence for mergers, attempts
to deal with the market power motivation within the context of competition
or antitrust law. There is also evidence that the market power motivation
accounts for relatively few takeovers.",
(il) Empire building
The response to this argument is that the evidence strongly supports
the inference that takeovers produce real gains.ls The rejoinder to this
is that unless the monitoring process is perfect the empire building motive
can exist.116
With respect to the empire building claim, the following additional
points may warrant consideration. The empire building motive probably
has outlets other than takeovers, such as acquisitions of assets and other
forms of investment. Increasing takeover premiums would tend to
discourage the takeover outlet for an empire building motivation. How-
ever, to the extent a premium increase reduces takeover frequency it
would tend to reduce the deterrent effect of takeovers on other forms
of empire building.-7 Where the balance lies depends on: the effect of
increasing takeover premiums on the frequency of takeovers; and on
the deterrent effect of takeovers on empire building. It would also depend
on the significance of takeovers as a method of empire building relative
to other methods, since increasing takeover premiums would only reduce
the takeover method of empire building. Even if the balance lies in favour
of increasing the takeover premium, it may be preferable to find a more
13 Ibid at 10, note 22.
114 Some evidence that market power gains do not generally account for horizontal mergers
has been provided by B.E. Eckbo, "Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth" (1983)
11 J. Fin. Econ. 241. However, the evidence was inconclusive. (See the discussion by P. Halpem,
"Corporate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event Studies Applied to
Acquisitions" (1983) 33 L Fin. 297.) A more recent study by professor Eckbo provides stronger
evidence that most mergers are not motivated by market power gains. (See B.E. Eckbo, "Mergers
and the Market Concentration Doctrine: Evidence from the Capital Market" (1985) 58 J. Bus.
325.)
15 Ibid at 11.
116 Bebchuk IL supra, note 1 at 37.
117 Since empire building by whatever method is indicative of inefficient management that
will be monitored by the takeover threat, any reduction in the takeover threat will reduce the
degree of monitoring of empire building.
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precisely targeted solution to empire building than a premium increase
which may deter other socially beneficial takeovers.1
The reasons given for private gains exceeding social gains suggest
that some method of reducing the private gains should be employed.
With respect to the tax and market power motives, a more specific method
of reducing private gains is preferable to an auction regime which could
deter other beneficial takeovers. The empire building and undervaluation
motivations appear to be of little significance and may well be more
effectively controlled by the discipline of the securities market or by
techniques other than auctions.-9 Consequently, the argument that private
gains exceed social gains does not lead to the conclusion that auctions
are necessary.
(b) Other welfare effects
It has been argued that promoting competitive bidding in takeovers
has a number of effects that are beneficial from a social welfare
perspective.
(i) Auctions move assets to their most highly valued uses
Promoting auctions in takeovers will increase the likelihood that
the target will be acquired by the firm to which it is most valuable.120
In other words, it encourages the movement of assets to their most highly
valued use. Investment bankers receiving fees for the information they
provide, which fees, according to the argument, are contingent on the
success of the offer, would, with competitive bidding, search for the
highest-valuing user.121 A potential buyer, recognizing it is not the highest-
valuing user, will have an incentive to pass the information on to other
bidders because competitive bidding will tend to give it a significant
premium on the shares it purchases in advance.122 If the target's man-
agement initiates the acquisition, competitive bidding will reduce the
potential for management to seek an acquirer other than the highest-
valuing user to serve its own interest.123
118 Empire building may best be controlled by the market. Managers subject to the discipline
of an efficient market will have an incentive to reduce empire building to the point it is cost
effective to do so. See M. Jensen & W. Meckling, "Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm"
(1976) 3 J. Fin. Eco. 305.
119 For instance, a tax on takeovers could be used to reduce private gains.
120 Gilson I, supra, note 1 at 872 and Bebchuk I, supra, note I at 1048.
121 Bebchuk, supra, note 1 at 40.
122 Ibid
123 Jbd
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The counter argument claims that where there is no competitive
bidding, even if the acquirer does not put the assets to their most highly
valued use, the assets can either be resold together or can be divided
up and sold to firms that can put the assets to their most highly valued
use.12, It may be that the value of many targets is highest if bundles
of their assets are transferred to different firms, in which case competitive
bidding would not avoid retransfer.5 Indeed, there is empirical evidence
showing that when firms divest a portion of their assets, an increase
in value generally results.26 The costs of competitive bidding may be
greater than the transaction costs of retransfers where initial acquisitions
are made without an auction.27 This is an empirical question which has
yet to be resolved.
It has been suggested that an empire building-acquirer management
may not want to resell assets acquired through a takeover bid without
an auction.12s But, this claim seems unlikely when an empire building
management prefers size of revenues. Such an empire building man-
agement would have an incentive to sell to a higher-valuing user and
use the sale proceeds to increase the size and/or revenues of their firm.
For instance, if the target's assets are worth $5 million to an acquiring
empire building management but are worth $6 million to some other
firm, then the empire building management could sell the assets for some
amount in excess of $5 million and use the profits to buy more assets
to grow to a larger size and generate greater revenue.29
Some claims, in the argument that auctions are necessary to allocate
the assets of targets to their most highly valued uses, seem dubious.
A legal regime encouraging competitive bidding does not seem necessary
to give investment bankers and potential buyers an incentive to find
and relay information to the highest-valuing user. Even where there is
no competitive bidding, fees for the information are liable to be higher
when the highest-valuing user is found.13o Nonetheless, competitive bidding
may be a more effective, less costly way of allocating a target's assets
124 Easterbrook & Fischell IL supra, note 1 at 14.
125 Ibid at 14 and notes 31-32.
126 See Hite & Owers, "Security Price Reactions Around Corporate Spin-Off Announcements"
(1983) 12 J. Fin. Econ. 409 and K Schipper & A. Smith, "Effects of Recontracting on Shareholder
Wealth: The Case of Voluntary Spin-Offs" (1983) 12 L Fin. Econ. 437.
127 See Easterbrook & Fischel IL supra, note 1 at 14 and Schwartz I, supra, note I at 243.
128 See Bebchuk IL supra, note 1 at 41-42 and Gilson IM supra, note 1 at 63.
129 See Schwartz I, supra, note 1 at 243.
130 See Schwartz I, supra, note 1 at 276. Bebchuk however claims that the difference between
the value of an investment banker's information to the highest-valuing user and another bidder
will be much greater under an auction regime because the other bidder will have little chance
of winning an auction and so will be willing to pay much less for the information.
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to their most highly-valued use. Consequently, the differences in costs
between auctions and retransfers, as well as the degree of reluctance
of acquirer managements to resell acquired assets, are important empirical
questions to resolve. Auctions may thus be the most efficient way of
allocating assets to their most highly-valued use. If this is true, then
it would suggest that there should be a mandatory auction regime.
(ii) Auctions encourage initial investment in potential targets
It has also been argued that auctions encourage initial investment
in potential targets.131 The potential gains from the acquisition of a target
would not exist if there had not been an initial investment in the corporation
that was ultimately identified as a target.132 These investments are
encouraged when target shareholders are given a larger share of the
gains from takeovers through the encouragement of auctions.
It has been noted as well that the argument depends on investors
being able to identify targets in advance.133 Even if targets could be
identified in advance, why encourage investment in these firms where
there is likely an inferior employment of production resources?13,
It seems unreasonable to encourage investment in an inferior use
of resources, as is the case where target management is inefficient. Perhaps
the argument for higher premiums to encourage prior investments in
targets depends on another takeover motivation, such as the synergy
motivation. If a firm producing a synergistic gain cannot be an acquirer
in combining with another firm, then perhaps some allocation of gains
in takeovers to targets is necessary to encourage initial investment in
the target's synergy-producing activity. Again, this would require that
the target be identified by investors long in advance of the target being
identified by takeover bidders. It would require, with respect to the synergy
motivation, that the initial investors identify these potential future gains
from the assets when combined with those of another firm. If they can
do this then why wouldn't bidders have been able to identify these potential
future gains and invest in the assets themselves?
There is, however, an argument that a situation may exist in which
shareholders can identify in advance a target likely to produce synergistic
gains that acquirers are less likely to produce.,35 It is claimed that the
131 Bebchuk 1, supra, note 1 at 1049.
'32 Ibid
133 Easterbrook & Fischel II, supra, note 1 at 20.
134 Ibid. See note 76 for a discussion of how an expected premium to target shareholders
can lead to an inefficient allocation of assets if potential targets can be identified.
135 Such a situation is described in D.W. Leebron, "Games Corporations Play: A Theory of
Tender Offers" (1986) 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 153 at 210.
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optimal firm size for invention is small.36 Once a small firm produces
an invention it may be better developed by a larger firm. It may also
be that the most efficient way to provide for development by a larger
firm is to have the larger firm and smaller firm combine.,37 Larger firms
tend to be acquirers more often than smaller firms, implying that the
smaller firm is more likely to be a target.138 In such a case, shareholders
may predict that a firm will be a synergy-producing target and they
will have a greater incentive to invest in those firms, if those firms are
given takeover gains.
If this and other situations favouring allocations of gains to targets
exist, then a target should be allowed to set up a situation where it
can reap these gains. This could be done by allowing appropriate pre-
takeover amendments to the articles and by-laws of corporations.39 It
would not require a mandatory takeover bid auction regime, although
an enabling statute (allowing a corporation to opt in or out before a
takeover announcement) could be provided as a transaction cost-reducing
mechanism.14o Even if a situation exists in which firms destined to become
targets produce takeover gains, it does not imply that an auction regime
provided by mandatory takeover bid legislation is appropriate.
In summary, the claim that auctions are necessary to promote an
initial investment in targets is only valid in the rare situation where the
target produces synergistic gains and can be identified in advance as
a probable target. Even in this situation, the claim does not favour a
mandatory auction regime.
(iii) Auctions encourage target managements to search for acquirers
Target management, having incentives to increase the firm's value,
it is argued, will search for potential acquirers if some of the gain can
be appropriated to the target. Most of the gain will go to acquirers if
they can proceed by way of a cash takeover bid at a low premium.
This is because the maximum they will pay in a negotiated transaction
136 See Leebron, supra, note 135 at 210 quoting Gilman & Siczek, "Optimization of Inventivity"
(1985) Research Management, July-Aug. 29.
137 See Leebron, supra, note 135 at 210.
138 See Coffee, supra, note 1 at 1227, note 248 and see Baldwin & Gorecki, "Mergers and
Merger Policy in the Canadian Manufacturing Sector. 1971-79" Economic Council of Canada,
Discussion Paper No. 297.
139 Leebron, supra, note 135 at 217-18 makes an argument along these lines.
140 Leebron, supra, note 135 at 218 claims that an enabling statute would be appropriate.
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will be the amount they would have to pay in a cash takeover bid.,41
An auction, by raising the premiums expected in an acquisition of the
target, increases the gain the target can get in either a negotiated
transaction or a takeover bid and thus increases the incentive for target
management to look for potential acquirers.142
In response, it has been maintained that managers dedicated to
shareholder interests would search for acquirers whether or not a takeover
bid was announced. Once there is an announced takeover bid, the search
may be ill-motivated. A rule requiring a passive target management
response to announced takeover bids would only hinder the ill-motivated
type of search.,43
The pro-auction proponents respond that the gains to shareholders
from the search for acquirers by dedicated managements would be reduced
if takeover premiums to target shareholders were diminished. The
reduction in takeover premiums is likely to drastically reduce the target
management's search efforts because they value their independence.
Target management might, however, engage in search where there are
substantial takeover premiums because they may have incentives to
increase the firm's value.'" It seems unlikely that target management
would seek acquirers where the takeover is motivated by potential gains
from the replacement of inefficient management. If this is the predominant
motive for takeovers, then rules allowing target shareholders to get
significant takeover premiums are unlikely to encourage search by target
managements. Encouraging search by targets seems more appropriate
when the takeover is motivated by potential synergistic gains. In this
case, managers may have an incentive to undertake the transaction; they
may be fortunate enough to remain a part of the resulting enterprise
and reap the benefits. Where both potential acquirers and targets can
be expected to engage in search, the appropriate allocation of the premium
(from the standpoint of encouraging an efficient level of search) would
be in favour of the party who can search at least cost.',"
It is not clear, however, that a target management's incentive to
search is a function of the premium their shareholders get in the takeover.
141 If target management, in a negotiated takeover, demanded a higher amount than the
prospective acquirer would have to pay if it proceeded by way of a cash takeover bid, then the
prospective acquirer could be expected to discontinue the negotiations and make a takeover bid.
Thus the premium in the cash takeover bid would be the maximum premium the target could
demand in a negotiated takeover.
142 Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 1049.
143 Easterbrook & Fischel If, supra, note 1 at 12.
14 Bebchuk 11, supra, note 1 at 38-39.
145 This is noted in Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 264, note 7.
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If they can remain with the combined firm,146 target management may
well reap the benefits of increased firm size and value regardless of
the premium target shareholders receive. Thus, the likelihood of target
management receiving benefits may be increased where there is more
searching and a greater frequency of takeovers. This will be more likely
to occur if acquirers get most of the gains from the takeover. Indeed,
since target management's search efforts will be more likely to result
in a takeover, they may search more if there is a greater frequency of
takeovers.
However, even if a target management would have an incentive
to search if gains in takeover bids were allocated to the target, it does
not mean that a mandatory auction regime should be provided. A target
could, under a permissive corporate law regime, put provisions in the
corporation's articles prior to any takeover announcement, thereby
allowing the target to obtain gains in a takeover. An enabling legislative
auction regime could be provided to reduce transactions costs. The target
could either design its own auction or adopt the legislative scheme.
(iv) Competitive bidding encourages useful exchanges of information
A further claim is that abandoning competitive bidding will induce
bidders to proceed with immediate cash takeover bids rather than approach
target management in order to obtain specific information about the
target. Bidders would proceed in this way since an immediate cash
takeover bid would eliminate the danger that target management will
start looking for other potential buyers. This would discourage useful
information exchanges and thus increase the risk of value-reducing rather
than value-increasing takeovers.,,7
The response to this is that it assumes that acquirers are irrational
in suggesting that an acquirer is unable to assess when it should make
friendly overtures to obtain information. Encouraging competitive bidding
simply reduces the acquirer's options and puts the acquirer in an awkward
position if friendly overtures are used as a signal for defensive actions.,48
This response is said to ignore the perspective of social wealth. From
this perspective, it is desirable to reduce the risk of error, but a prospective
146 It may be difficult for target management to remain part of the combined entity. Even
where a takeover is not motivated by a desire to replace inefficient management, some management
position may become redundant if the acquirer and the target are combined. A study cited by
Coffee, supra, note 1 at 1239, note 281 found that on average 20% of a target's executives are
gone within one year of a takeover, 36% are gone within two years, and 52% are gone within
three years.
147 Bebchuk I, supra, note 1 at 1050.
148 Easterbrook & Fischel I, supra, note 1 at 13.
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acquirer considers not only the risk of error but also the premium it
will pay.49 This might be further explained as follows. Suppose target
management has non-public information relevant to determining the value
of the target. Suppose this information would reduce the risk associated
with a given estimate of the value of the target. Suppose further that
the acquirers and investors in the market who will assess the value of
the acquisition are risk averse. It is neither to the benefit of acquirers
or society to have the acquisition proceed without the use of the
information, nor to have the information wastefully reproduced by the
acquirer. However, if legal rules do not promote competitive bidding,
approaching target management to get information may encourage
competitive bidding which would not have occurred otherwise. This may
increase the takeover premium to the point where the risk reduction
will not compensate for the reduced potential takeover gain accruing
to the acquirer. The acquirer may thus choose not to approach target
management for the information. If competitive bidding was already
provided for, such that it would occur whether or not the acquirer
approached the target, little or nothing would be lost by approaching
target management.
The information exchange argument may have relevance where the
takeover will not replace an entrenched target management. However,
where the takeover is likely to result in the replacement of target
management, target management, wishing to retain their management
positions, will have an incentive not to release the information even if
it will significantly increase the premium target shareholders would
receive. Thus, the argument appears to have little relevance where the
takeover is motivated by the gains from replacing inefficient management.
(c) A summary of the social welfare perspective
The search for takeover targets may be excessive where it is motivated
by an undervaluation, tax or market power gains, or empire building.
However, the tax and market power gains should be dealt with under
other legislation which addresses those issues more specifically, and the
undervaluation and empire building motives are probably insignificant
and may not be best dealt with by intervening with a mandatory auction
regime. The other welfare effects of auctions (with the possible exception
of the claim that auctions will best move assets to their most highly-
valued use) are doubtful sources of welfare gains. Where situations exist
149 Bebchuk IM supra, note 1 at 44-45.
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in which such gains are possible, the gains could be achieved without
a mandatory auction regime.
C. Other Diseconomies of Increasing the Frequency of Takeovers
Professor Coffee notes other diseconomies that may occur or be
exacerbated by an increase in the frequency of takeovers.,5o
1. Empire building - inefficient transfers
(a) The incentive for inefficient firms to take over efficient firms
Coffee argues that there is a diseconomy from the potential for
an inefficient bidder to acquire an efficient target for reasons that are
in the best interests of the bidder's shareholders. Two stories are given
as to how this might occur. Firstly, a corporation might improve its below
average performance by acquiring a more efficient corporation. Small
corporations have been found to be systematically undervalued (the "small
firm effect"). A large corporation might improve its return by acquiring
a small corporation. Secondly, the bidder may acquire a relatively large
target that has a higher internal rate of return than the bidder.15,
The first claim proceeds without an explanation of the small firm
effect. An undervaluation of small firms does not necessarily mean they
are more efficient. Indeed, other explanations for the small firm effect
aside, if a small firm is more efficient and the market realizes this, then
it will not be undervalued. The small firm effect is unlikely to arise
because of its efficiency. For instance, it may be due to a liquidity effect;
the small firm would have to provide higher returns to compensate for
the difficulty of selling the firm's shares. It may also be due to the statistical
problems involved in analyzing stock prices in thinly-traded markets.,52
If there is an efficiency in smallness, then it will not behove a large
firm to acquire the small firm and combine the two into a single firm.
This would eliminate the potential gain from the smallness of the target.
If the acquirer wanted the gain, it would simply hold the small firm's
shares as an equity investment allowing it to operate as it had before
with no reduction in the efficiency of the use of the underlying assets.
In short, it seems highly unlikely that an inefficient large firm would
150 Coffee, supra, note 1.
151 Ibid at 1225-29.
152 These and other explanations are reviewed in G.W. Schwert, "Size and Stock Returns,
and Other Empirical Regularities" (1983) 12 J. Fin. Econ. 3.
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take over a small firm and make changes which would result in a net
reduction in the sum of the values of the two firms.
The claim that an acquirer may have a lower rate of return than
a target suggests that an acquirer can obtain a private gain from taking
over the target that is greater than the social gain. Indeed, there is
apparently a social loss since the acquirer's lower rate of return supposedly
suggests it is less efficient. Coffee notes one study comparing returns
on equity which found that returns on equity of targets were no lower
than that of the bidders in all of eleven cases studied.s3 Coffee also
notes another study in which in 19 of 41 cases studied in Britain from
1967 to 1970, the acquired firm was more profitable than the acquirer.54
These studies were based on accounting data and do not take risk into
account in the relative profitability or returns on equity. To be able to
say anything based on a comparison of returns on equity, the risk would
have to be held constant. If the target's return on the market value of
equity is greater than the acquirer's for a given level of risk, then either
the acquirer is overvalued, or the target is undervalued. If, for a given
level of risk, the acquirer is overvalued and the target is correctly valued
(in which case the return on the acquirer's shares will be lower than
on the target's shares), there is no gain to the acquirer's shareholders
from the acquisition unless there is some wealth-creating gain such as
synergy or the replacement of inefficient management. These results would
also be a social gain. If the target is undervalued, then the argument
is reduced to the one discussed above concerning takeovers being
motivated by undervaluation.5s
In short, the only explanation for an inefficient firm to take over
an efficient firm is that the acquirer's management are engaging in empire
building. Thus, the theory is the same as the one dealing with empire
building discussed above.56
(b) Inferior external monitoring
According to Coffee, internal monitoring will generally outperform
external monitoring. His argument proceeds as follows. Generally, a
corporate executive staff no longer makes operating decisions but instead
has primarily a monitoring function that, in effect, performs the function
of a miniature capital market. An attempt to replace this development
with a capital market discipline seems to be a step backward.157
153 Coffee, supra, note 1 at 1227.
154 b
155 Aid, see Part HI B(2Xa).
156 Ibid, see Part I B(2Xa).
157 bid at 1230.
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Coffee claims there is also potential for an ineffective transfer due
to the acquirer making an acquisition based on information that is inferior
to the information of target management. The premium offered by the
bidder is based on the bidder's sole judgment rather than the collective
judgment of the market which is presumably capable of digesting more
information than any single decision maker. Competitive bidding requires
a higher bid which would indicate considerable confidence in the bidder's
judgment and would tend to reduce erroneous judgments.- Competitive
bidding will tend to lead to a white knight, with considerably more
information, winning the bidding contest.'s9 Management are not infallible
and will inevitably make errors even if they are otherwise efficient. An
error which lowers the stock price may cause the management to be
unnecessarily replaced. This risk would be reduced under a high takeover
premium policy16o
The argument that corporate executive staffs perform the function
of an internal miniature capital market (which is apparently more efficient
given the development of these internal miniature capital markets) is
used to argue that the market which led to the development of these
internal miniature capital markets should be precluded from reversing
its decision in cases where the internal monitor performs poorly. The
agency cost problem plagues the relationship between the internal monitor
and those they monitor just as it plagues the relationship between the
shareholders and the internal monitor. If a bidder can do a better
monitoring job than the current internal monitors and can provide a
net reduction in agency costs, then it will provide a social gain. In short,
why not let the external capital market decide when it can do better
than the internal monitors.
Perhaps, as Coffee argues, bidders in the external capital market
will have inferior information to that of target management (the internal
monitors). Bidders may make errors with their inferior information. This
argument assumes that targets will not release their better information
to the market. It might well be beneficial to society to have the information
released. However, when this will not happen, such as when an inefficient
target management refuses to release information that will assist in a
takeover that replaces them, then, from a social welfare point of view,
the takeover will have to be assessed on the trade-off between risk and
return without the information. Given that the information will not be
produced, Coffee's analysis does not show that the trade-off between
158bid at 1231-32.
159 Ibid at 1233.
160 /bid at 1233-34.
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risk and return for a bidder differs from the social welfare-maximizing
risk-return trade-off. Markets are not perfect. Mistakes in exchanges are
made and are apparent with hindsight even though the decision was
rational ex ante. The argument that higher premiums would make bidders
more sure of their decisions would seem to apply to all markets where
there is less than perfect information. It suggests that all prices should
be raised to reduce the risk of error. The argument seems to be no
different than the information exchange argument raised above.,l6
2. The impact on the managerial labour market
Coffee argues that increased compensation will be required in light
of the reduced security caused by the increased takeover frequency that
can result from a low premium policy. The insecurity will be significant
where a firm has become a potential target and the increased compensation
required will make it difficult for potential targets to rehabilitate them-
selves by acquiring new managers. There might also be a migration of
existing managers to less vulnerable firms. Thus, increasing the effec-
tiveness of the market for corporate control impairs the efficiency of
the executive labour market. The labour market is likely to be a superior
control over management inefficiency since it has lower transactions costs
and less potential for resort to "shark repellent" techniques and since
incumbent management is less likely to oppose this control.162
The claim that additional compensation will have to be given to
attract new managers and prevent existing managers from leaving requires
that the labour market be capable of identifying which firms are potential
targets. This is an empirical question. If potential targets can be identified
by the labour market, then there remains the empirical question of the
significance of the compensation demanded for insecurity and the degree
to which managers will migrate to less vulnerable firms. Even if empirical
evidence supports the claim, it can only cause an allocative inefficiency
in the takeover process if the costs are external to that process. It is
not clear that the costs of added insecurity to those who are or could
be target managers are really costs externalized in the takeover process.
Although these costs are not incurred by bidders, they are costs which
are internal to managing inefficiently. If management is inefficient then
161 Ibid., see Part II B(2)(bXiv).
162 Ibid at 1234-38.
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it will incur these additional compensation costs.63 This will deter
management from being inefficient. This deterrence from the threat of
takeover is one of the benefits of encouraging takeovers.
Perhaps Professor Coffee's claim is that the nature of human
behaviour is such that this deterrence will be excessive in that it will
put too much pressure on the management of firms causing them to
perform less efficiently than they otherwise would.-" Although bidders
will not consider this alleged cost in any given takeover because it will
be spread over all firms, it is a cost that will be faced by the managements
and shareholders of firms. It will be in the interests of both shareholders
and management to attempt to correct for this in the most efficient
manner.165 This might involve higher compensation or "shark repellent"
corporate charter amendments or some combination of these and possibly
other techniques. To argue that this problem should be dealt with by
raising premiums through takeover bid regulation requires that this be
shown to be a more effective or lower cost way of dealing with the
alleged problem than can be arrived at by techniques adopted by managers
and shareholders.
If insecurity is the problem, then it is unlikely that resort to the
labour market, to the extent that it involves the replacement of inefficient
management, will resolve the problem in a manner that incumbent
management is less likely to oppose.
3. Excess deterrence and the problem of demoralization
(a) Assimilation problems
Coffee claims that employees leave firms at a high rate in the event
of takeovers. It is hard to replace departed executives and differences
in operating styles and assimilation problems decrease efficiency.66 Coffee
says, "[t]he rebuttal of the neoclassical economist to these contentions
is predictable: if assimilation problems were indeed serious, the stock
market would penalize bidders that attempted unpromising acquisi-
tions."67 He says there is no evidence that this is happening because:
163 In efficient capital markets security prices will be discounted for the presence of agency
costs in the management-shareholder relationship and thus the management of the security issuing
firm will have an incentive to reduce these costs; see Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305.
164 This is noted by Coffee, supra, note I at 1238.
165 See note 163.
166 Coffee, supra, note 1 at 1238-43.
167 Ibid at 1241.
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(1) the market for corporate control is a competitive one in which white knights,
who presumably experience fewer assimilation difficulties, typically win battles
for corporate control;168 and
(2) bidders anticipating assimilation problems buy cash-laden companies where
human capital is a less important factor.169
The claim that those with fewer assimilation difficulties typically
win battles for corporate control supports the predicted neoclassical
economists' rebuttal. Those with fewer assimilation difficulties may
typically win because the market values such acquisitions more highly.
However, to the extent that legal rules permit target management to
provide a "white knight"17o with information giving them a competitive
advantage in a bidding contest in exchange for protection or compensation
of an entrenched inefficient management, it is clearly not beneficial.
Assuming that bidders focus on cash-laden companies and thereby
avoid a human capital problem, they then appear to support the neoc-
lassical economists' position. The focus on cash-laden companies is driven
by the bidders' knowledge that the stock market would penalize them
if they attempted unpromising acquisitions involving a human capital
problem. It may thus be that the market response is currently controlling
attempts at unpromising acquisitions.
(b) An incentive for shirking and self-dealing
Coffee further claims that once a takeover is imminent, there is
a strong incentive on target management to shirk and engage in self-
dealing. The problem is more pervasive under a low takeover premium
policy.17,
Consider the case where the takeover is imminent but no takeover
bid has been made. The costs of self-dealing and shirking may be
encouraged by an imminent takeover where management is likely to
be replaced but the costs are a result, in the first instance, of management
being inefficient. In efficient capital markets, these costs will be anticipated
and will be borne by management. The costs will thus be a deterrent
to inefficient behaviour by management.
Where shirking and self-dealing occurs after a takeover bid is made,
the absence of takeover bid rules that delay the takeover will be beneficial.
The short takeover bid period (where there are no takeover bid rules
168 Ibid
169 Ibid
170 See note 38.
171 Coffee, supra, note 1 at 1242.
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delaying the bid) will reduce the time over which this kind of detrimental
behaviour will occur.
(c) The shift toward risk preference
(i) Debt and liquidity risk
Coffee argues that targets will engage in takeovers that reduce
liquidity (by which Professor Coffee apparently means a reduction in
working capital, particularly cash and marketable securities) and increase
indebtedness to avoid being taken over themselves. The reduced liquidity
and increased indebtedness augment risk and this risk increase is
exacerbated by lower takeover premiums which would encourage such
takeovers.'7
There may well be a point at which, or a range over which, the
level of debt and the amount of working capital are optimal. Adding
debt can increase the tax savings from the tax deduction of interest.
These benefits will be constrained by the added risk of incurring
bankruptcy costs. Adding to the level of debt may also reduce agency
costs.17 Working capital, in the form of accounts receivable, cash, and
marketable securities, is said to be, at best, a zero net present value
investment. Thus, the less working capital one has to have, the better.
Again, the risk of incurring bankruptcy costs may be a problem with
too little working capital, and having working capital reduces the
transaction costs of raising interim financing. Thus, the level of working
capital should be kept as low as possible while taking into account these
costs.
There are, therefore, gains from increasing debt and reducing-
working capital. Shareholders can benefit from these gains and deal with
any added risk by adjusting their investment portfolios. Management,
however, will tend to have a great deal of their income-generating capacity
tied up in the enterprise they manage. They will thus be less able to
adjust to the added risk of increased debt and reduced-working capital.
Instead, they will avoid the risk, contrary to the interests of shareholders,
by not increasing debt and reducing working capital. This will make
the corporation less valuable in the market. An outsider may perceive
that by buying the corporation, increasing the debt, and reducing the
172 Ibid at 1243-44.
173 The tax deductibility of debt gives an increased return from adding debt. Liquid assets
can generally be argued to be, at best, zero net present value investments such that they should
be reduced. The increase in debt and reduction in liquidity is, however, constrained by the increase
in expected bankruptcy costs.
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working capital, it can increase the value of the corporation, thus providing
the outsider with a gain. This takeover threat, rather than cause too
much debt and too little working capital, puts pressure on management
to have an amount of debt and working capital more in accord with
shareholders' interests.
(ii) Detriment to creditors
Coffee also argues that bidders will increase their riskiness by
engaging in heavily debt-financed takeovers to the detriment of existing
creditors. Because the hostile takeover bid is for cash, it provides a unique
opportunity for taking advantage of existing creditors which is not offered
by equity-financed mergers. Although large creditors can protect them-
selves, employees, suppliers, pensioners, and lower level managers
cannot.,74
It is not clear that just because a hostile takeover bid is typically
for cash, it is unique. Presumably, a merger or any other acquisition
could be made with cash and be entirely debt-financed. The problem
is thus a general problem that does not call for the isolated response
of increasing premiums in takeover bids. Further, small creditors may
well be protected by the need for the firm to make subsequent arrange-
ments with the same or other small creditors who will make adjust-
ments based on the firm's previous behaviour, resulting in reduced ex-
tension of credit or in higher interest rates on the credit advanced. This
will lessen the firm's incentive to take advantage of existing creditors.
Unless employees and low level managers have significant outstand-
ing amounts owing to them, it is unlikely that heavy debt-financing will
cause them much of a loss. To the extent it does, it will have repercussions
with respect to hiring new employees and management and retaining
existing employees and management because they will demand greater
compensation in light of the higher risk of non-payment. This will result
in similar compensation cost repercussions to the extent that taking on
added debt reduces the expected value of pension claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Economic analyses of legal rules relating to takeovers have argued
that takeover-bid legislation and permitted management defensive tactics
interfere with beneficial takeovers by encouraging competitive bidding.
Arguments, however, have been made in favour of such competitive
bidding. It has been disputed that the interference is not great, firstly,
174 See discussion in Coffee, supra, note 1.
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because bidders get adequate returns and, secondly, because higher
premiums may increase the returns to searching for targets whereas
lowered premiums may reduce ex ante target shareholder wealth. Further,
it has been argued that a number of motivations for takeovers lead to
private, but not social gains, and that the absence of competitive bidding
both reduces the likelihood that assets will be allocated to their most
highly-valued use and discourages prior investments in targets, search
for acquirers by targets, and useful information exchanges. Assertions
have also been made that a low takeover premium policy will lead to
inefficient transfers, interference with the managerial labour market's
ability to respond to managerial inefficiency, excess deterrence and
demoralization of management, and a shift towards unduly risky
takeovers.
Given the above-noted responses and comments concerning the
arguments in favour of competitive bidding, it is apparent that the most
important outstanding issues in the debate are the magnitude of the
problem, and the likelihood and cost of allocating assets to the most
highly-valued uses through competitive bidding as opposed to transfers.
Consequently, empirical work needs to be done to assess the effect of
takeovers on management inefficiency. This would allow an assessment
of the cost of trade-offs in favour of, for instance, encouraging competitive
bidding to allocate assets to their most highly-valued use. Empirical work
also needs to be done to assess the likelihood and cost of allocating
assets to their most highly-valued use through competitive bidding as
opposed to retransfers. Hopefully, further empirical work will shed new
light on these outstanding issues.
With the exception of the claim that auctions are necessary to allocate
assets to their most highly-valued use, none of the arguments in favour
of competitive bidding lead to the conclusion that a mandatory auction
regime is required. The benefits of auctions, to the extent they exist,
can be achieved with legislation that allows targets or information
producers to opt out of the scheme in favour of one more beneficial
to their needs.
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